I appreciate the editor's invitation to reply to Freedman et al.'s (1998) review of A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data (Princeton University Press). I welcome this scholarly critique and JASA's decision to publish in this eld. Ecological inference is a large and very important area for applications that is especially rich with open statistical questions. I hope this discussion stimulates much new scholarship. Freedman et al. raise several interesting issues, but also misrepresent or misunderstand the prior literature, my approach, and their own empirical analyses, and compound the problem by refusing requests from me and the editor to make their data and software available for this note. Some clari cation is thus in order.
I believe the excitement surrounding the publication of my book resulted from its unifying in a single statistical approach the insights of two literatures that had been in open warfare since the 1950s. Unlike Freedman et al.'s implication, I never claimed that all problems were resolved in my book (which is why the title referred to \a solution," rather than \the solution"). Numerous important issues remain, and much research is needed. With an area as uncertain and important as ecological inference, making available many solutions, formalized as statistical models, is critical for applied researchers.
Freedman et al. are right about one point: If you can avoid making inferences about individuals from aggregate data, you should do so. And of course valid survey data make ecological inferences super uous. Unfortunately, Freedman et al. do not consider the many researchers who must make ecological inferences, even when risky. This position is consistent with the low value David Freedman generally seems to put on model-based inference, such as in regression analysis for causal inference (Freedman, 1998) or sampling adjustments for the U.S. Census (Brown et al., 1998) , and may explain why Freedman et al. sometimes appear ambivalent about making ecological inferences even with their own model (1991: 682, 806) . As statisticians, if they feel uncomfortable with the assumptions, they can work on other problems, or conclude that \surveys o er a better approach" (p.701), but many applied researchers have no such options. For example, implementing the U.S. Voting Rights Act, and thus Court decisions about how to hold democratic elections, require ecological inferences since surveys about race are known to be misleading. Surveys are not available for most historical questions, such as who voted for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany. Ecological inferences are required for preliminary studies in elds like epidemiology for use in deciding which expensive individual-level data to collect. They are also essential for elds like marketing, education, sociology, political science, and others due to con dentiality or data limitations. Even when limited survey data are available, ecological or combined inferences are necessary for studying small geographic areas. Freedman et al.'s (1998) review is primarily concerned with comparing the method proposed by Freedman et al. (1991) to that in my book (now known as EI) and Goodman's (1953 Goodman's ( , 1959 regression. Predictably, Freedman et al. think their own approach outperforms both competitors. Since some information is lost to aggregation, it is no surprise that they were able to nd examples for which one of the EI models gives inaccurate answers. Indeed, my book includes a 35-page section (entitled \What Can Go Wrong?") with far more egregious examples they seem to have missed. The question is not whether one can nd data for which a statistical model will perform poorly, as this would be easy in almost any area of statistics. The question instead is how much information a model uses, how often you can recognize when the model is inappropriate, and whether the approach suggests other models in these instances. I show here that EI o ers progress in each area. This is Freedman et al.'s third attempt at promoting their \neighborhood model," either in its own right or as a foil to stop others from making ecological inferences. They introduced it in expert witness testimony, but it was dismissed out of hand (\As such, it is not a reliable method of inferring group voting behavior," Garza et al. v. County of Los Angeles, 1990: 35) , primarily because its key assumption, described below, is both unreasonable and untestable. It was o ered in the social sciences, but was rejected as \politically naive" (Grofman, 1991) and painting \a picture of America that no one would recognize | because it does not exist" (Lichtman, 1991) .
In 1991, Grofman and Lichtman discovered that Freedman et al. presented a biased sample of estimates and datasets that supported their approach and suppressed the remaining evidence which was contradictory. Freedman et al. did the same in 1998 by reporting estimates of (minority) Hispanic behavior but suppressing estimates for nonHispanic behavior, about which there is typically more information of the type EI could have extracted. However, their selective presentation cannot be corrected or completed without access to their data. Although we cannot know how often EI diagnostics could have detected problems with either their reported or unreported estimates, I show below with simulated data that match their requirements how EI can help in similar situations. From 1953 to 1997 , Goodman (1953 and Duncan and Davis (1953) were the only practically useful and thus the only widely used methods, despite an active methodological literature. In 1991, Freedman et al. proposed the neighborhood model as part of an attack on Goodman, but to my knowledge, it has never been used in applied research, and applications of Goodman's regression did not decline. In contrast, since it uses more information, allows more palatable assumptions, o ers a range of speci cations, and combines existing approaches, EI has seen use since 1997 in a number of academic disciplines and in industry and public policy.
Background
Following the running example in my book, the ecological inference problem uses the fraction of voting age people who are black X i and who vote T i (and the total number, N i ) to estimate the fraction of blacks b i and whites w i who vote in precinct i. A precinct is a voting booth and its associated geography; p precincts compose a legislative district. The secret ballot prevents computing the cross-tabulation directly. Since precincts have known identities (unlike say anonymous survey respondents), real applications come with considerable qualitative information (largely ignored by Freedman et al.) .
Since 1953, two hotly contested approaches have dominated the literature, those following the monumental contributions of Goodman (1953 Goodman ( , 1959 , and Duncan and Davis (1953) . Goodman showed that the accounting identity information this provides depends on the application, but it can be substantial. For example, as I showed, if precincts in a scatterplot of X i by T i are uniformly spread over the unit square, the average width of the bounds on b i are reduced from 0,1] to less than half that range, hence eliminating 50% of the ecological inference problem with certainty. The information also varies over i, so that we might have b i ; w i consistent with X i and T i for precinct i. Ecological inference may have more uncertainty than other inferences, due to aggregation, but it also o ers remarkable certainty for some quantities of interest.
Freedman et al.'s neighborhood model assumes b i = w i , i.e., black and white turnout are equal. This assumption narrows estimates of each to T i with a 0 standard error (thus, applying their \Z score" evaluation to their own model, as they did to EI in Table 1 , indicates worse performance than all other approaches). The model could be formulated as approximate with meaningful standard errors, but this has not been done. Researchers have found this model useless, as it assumes the answer to the question, e.g., whether black and white turnout are equal.
Freedman et al.'s model is a clever way to restate the indeterminacy of the problem: since T i always falls within the bounds, the assumption cannot be rejected from the data alone. Precinct estimates are given by where the corresponding tomography line crosses the 45 diagonal. Among the many other possible untestable assumptions is Nancy Zingale's earlier (1984) proposal to use the mid-point of the bounds. The fully general result is given in King (1997: 191) : an assumption about the joint density of b i and w i cannot be rejected from the data so long as it has mass over any curve that connects the bottom left and top right points of a tomography plot. This fundamental indeterminacy is one way of expressing the information lost due to aggregation (Chapter 3 gives the others).
The EI Approach
The key feature of EI is that it uses information from statistical, deterministic, diagnostic, and qualitative sources, whereas previous approaches used only one of the rst two. Although supporters of Goodman, and Duncan and Davis have been at each other's throats for years, I showed that the two approaches can be combined in a way that improves on each | rst extracting the often substantial unit-level deterministic information and then statistically borrowing strength to narrow in probabilistically within these bounds. This formalizes what the best applied analysts do informally by applying the bounds as post hoc checks on Goodman's regression (a key point Freedman et al. missed in 1991 and i ) or Cov(X i ; w i ) increases from 0, the absolute bias of Goodman's regression increases linearly without limit, but for EI it increases linearly at the start, then slows, and nally reaches a maximum and stops (King, 1997: 180) . How fast the maximum is reached depends on how informative are the bounds | which is known from the aggregate data. Thus, the risks are knowable ex ante if, unlike Freedman et al., you look before you run an analysis. This speci cation uncertainty should be added to the computed model uncertainty before drawing conclusions. (3) Because the bounds are used, b i and w i can be functions of X i without Goodman's identi cation problem. shows that E(T i jX i ) with 80% con dence intervals do not t the X i ; T i points and so something is wrong. The right graph plots X i by the (vertical) bounds on b i , demonstrating that, wherever the b i 's fall, Cov( b i ; X i ) > 0 and so the basic EI model assumption of independence is rejected. Although no guarantee given the lack of information, a formal test (ignored by cf. King, 1997: 178) for whether X i should be a covariate to control for this correlation is easily passed (the coe cient on the covariate is over ve standard errors from zero). This EI speci cation gives accurate estimates of 0.26,0.13 with standard errors of 0.02,0.07, and nominal con dence interval coverage of b i ; w i (8 i) at least as wide as the actual coverage.
Since EI keeps the posterior density within the bounds, the right graph shows how estimates of b i and w i can be correlated with X i even if they are a priori independent, an important component of robustness and model checking. This plot also shows how adding the information from Duncan-Davis can greatly improve the Goodman approach, which yields estimates of 0:41; ?0:61 and is not even identi ed with X i as a covariate.
The diagnostics will not always detect problems, but this example shows that they are helpful in some data. Whether they would help in Freedman et al.'s data is impossible to tell, since they fail to present most diagnostics, misinterpret warning messages they generated by choosing incorrect speci cations, use irrelevant tests like whether the regression of T i on X i is signi cant, and consider the e ects of heteroskedasticity where it does not matter much (B b and B w ) but ignore where it normally does matter ( b i and w i ). The nal source of information EI uses is qualitative, a critical source which Freedman et al. ignore. Because information is lost to aggregation, the only way to improve inferences after using information in X i , T i , and N i is through external sources. Qualitative information may include ethnographies, participant observations, intensive interviews, partial survey data, journalistic accounts, historical studies, prior quantitative research, detailed information on a few precincts, and the like | the full range of data collection schemes used in the social sciences. If you are unsure of the answers of a survey respondent, you're out of luck. If you are unsure of the results from the precinct or of an assumption in an ecological inference model, qualitative information can be essential. At worst, you can go to the precinct and look around! The importance of qualitative information has been undervalued in the statistical literature on this problem, and perhaps even more generally except in some discussions of Bayes. However, it has been a long-standing concern among social science methodologists and applied researchers (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994) . The EI approach includes this information as an integral part of the process of inference, and the software facilitates this process by allowing priors and other speci cation options. This enables the researcher to add external information at numerous points in an analysis. Even if qualitative information led you to believe that b i = w i was approximately right, using EI with this prior would better represent the available information than a degenerate posterior for each spiked at T i = b i = w i , as Freedman et al. recommend. Letting qualitative information guide model speci cation is a major deviation from Goodman's approach, which for all practical purposes o ers only one option. Unlike the impression left by Freedman et al., EI results are not what come spinning out of the software with all 50+ options set at their defaults. Valid ecological inferences require considerable thought and evaluation of the many types of evidence that are available as part of real applications. Freedman et al. (1998 Freedman et al. ( :1521 consider qualitative information only in their discussion of what covariates to use but, instead of doing the hard qualitative research themselves, they try only a sample of variables listed in one passage in my book (1997:171) . However, they neglect to mention that these variables were not uncovered by my qualitative research; indeed, I was merely quoting from their 1991 work, in which they justi ed why unit-level parameters should vary over i as in their neighborhood model. Apparently, their 1998 analyses demonstrate that their 1991 justi cations were wrong. Qualitative information is essential in ecological inferences, but it is only valuable if, like quantitative data, substantial care and thought goes into its collection.
EI and Challenges for Statistical Research
Goodman's regression works when its assumptions hold but not otherwise. No information exists within this framework to tell whether its assumptions are right or wrong. In contrast, under EI, we now have ve scenarios, only the last of which is a problem: (1) If the assumptions are correct, you get the right answer (e.g., King, 1997 : Chapters 9 and 10). (2) If the assumptions are wrong, EI still does \well" (in the sense of MSE or absolute bias) when the bounds are su ciently informative; the degree to which the bounds are informative can easily be assessed from the aggregate data, and so the risks are known ex ante (e.g., King, 1997: Chapter 11) . (3) If the assumptions are wrong, and the bounds are not su ciently informative but the diagnostics are, then the assumptions can be changed and EI will do well (e.g., Figure 1 above, and King, 1997: 176-180, 187, 195, 238) . (4) If the basic assumptions are wrong and the bounds and diagnostics are not su ciently informative, but the researcher has additional qualitative knowledge, then more appropriate assumptions can be chosen. Then, either EI will do well, or the formal measures of uncertainty produced by EI (which are conditional on the model) can be supplemented and expanded accordingly. (5) If the assumptions are wrong and the bounds and diagnostics are not su ciently informative, and the researcher has no time to collect qualitative information, then EI will perform poorly (e.g., King, 1997: Figure 9 .2). Even in this worst case scenario, EI will be more robust than the Goodman approach since the maximum bias from EI is xed and knowable.
The odds of (1)-(4) occurring relative to (5) (as compared to the odds of the assumptions applying vs. not applying under Goodman's approach) summarize the advantages of EI. EI thus chips pieces o of Goodman's worst case (the assumptions not applying). The bene ts of EI are thus application-dependent, but known ex ante.
I believe EI is popular among researchers making ecological inferences because it uses more information | building on the fundamental approaches of both Goodman and Duncan-Davis, including diagnostics that can often detect when assumptions are wrong, and adding a large range of models to the researcher's toolkit so that qualitative information can be included. In a word, more information is better. The neighborhood model is a useful reminder about indeterminacies and uncertainties in ecological inference, but it is untestable and its assumption is unacceptable to applied researchers. Although methodologists have begun to build on the EI approach with hierarchical modeling (King, Rosen, and Tanner, 1999) , faster method of moment estimators (Lewis, 1998) , extensions to panel inference from independent cross-sectional surveys (Schuessler and Penubarti, 1997) , and nonparametric models (Rivers, 1998) , applied researchers in many elds could bene t from other developments. Some open issues include quantitative diagnostics, model selection, exible distributional and functional form speci cations, tractable extensions to multiple category and continuous individual-level variables, models for survey and ecological data, spatial autocorrelation, and the types of nonrandom measurement error common in ecological data. For statisticians willing to help the numerous researchers working on a diverse array of important problems with ecological data, many opportunities remain.
